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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the appellants timely filed a Notice of 
Appeal and where they failed to do so, is their failure a 
jurisdictional bar. 
2. If their appeal was timely and this Court has 
jurisdiction, do principals of res judicata bar the present 
case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It is important to understand the procedural posture of 
this case. 
The appellants filed an action in the Seventh Circuit 
Court in and for Uintah County naming Thrifty Auto Repair, 
John R. Slaugh, Randy Sidebottom and Showalter Ford and 
various John Does and alleging as cause of action a dispute 
over a repair bill to their automobile and the wrongful 
detention of that automobile by the defendants in 
combination with the primary culpability and involvement 
against the defendants other than Showalter Ford. 
The appellants prayed for actual damages and punitive 
damages up to the extent of the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Answers were filed by the respective defendants when, after 
a deluge of pleadings, the respondents, Sidebottom and 
Showalter Ford, tendered return of the vehicle pursuant to 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on or about January 20, 
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1986. Various affidavits were filed and a motion for 
summary judgment was made in behalf of Showalter Ford; 
memorandum having been submitted by both parties, the 
Circuit Court entered its summary judgment in favor of 
Showalter Ford which was granted by Judge Donald D. Crist on 
or about April 8, 1986. A motion was filed to add the 
defendant, Gary Showalter, which was considered by the court 
and denied, [Tr. 19], and the plaintiffs filed a notice of 
appeal and paid their filing fee appealing that action to 
the Seventh District Court as a Court of Appeals on or about 
April 30, 1986. That matter is still pending. 
On or about June 18, 1986, the appellants filed a new 
action in the Seventh District Court naming Showalter Ford 
Company, first; Gary Showalter, individually, next; then 
Randy Sidebottom; Thrifty Auto; John R. Slaugh, etc. This 
action included some allegations under the Utah Consumer 
Practices Act, but essentially set forth the same factual 
allegations concerning the same transactions and occurrences 
that were pending in the proceeding that had been appealed 
from the Circuit Court. 
From this point various pleadings were filed bearing 
the old Circuit Court number under the heading of Seventh 
Circuit Court, and District Court pleadings were filed in 
the new District Court case with erroneous civil numbers, 
many of the pleadings undated, many of the pleadings 
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untitled and many of the pleadings not understandable 
creating a tremendous burden and legal expense upon the 
respondents, Showalter Ford, Inc., and Gary Showalter. 
The appellants filed a motion to change venue and a 
motion to combine or consolidate the cases which motions 
were denied on July 23, 1986* Respondents, Showalter Ford, 
Inc., and Gary Showalter, filed a motion to dismiss or in 
the alternative for summary judgment on July 14, 1986, and 
after due consideration, with opportunities of response, 
Judge Davidson made a ruling of total dismissal of the case 
on August 13, 1986, [Tr. 78]. The ruling of the Court 
setting forth the Court's reasoning was mailed to all 
parties, presumably the date it was entered. Respondents, 
Showalter Ford, Inc., and Gary Showalter, prepared a 
judgment of dismissal and mailed copies to all parties and 
the original to the Court for signature, pursuant to Rule 
2.9(b) of the District Court Rules of Practice on August 18, 
1986, [Tr. 83, 93]. This judgment was signed and entered by 
the Court on September 10, 1986. A portion of Judge 
Davidson's ruling is appropriate: 
ffIn the event the plaintiffs intend to pursue this 
action through an appeal, the Court reminds them that 
the rules of civil procedure must be followed. The 
suggestion is made that plaintiffs consult with an 
attorney to assist them and be sure their legal and 
procedural rights are preserved." [Tr. 79]. 
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The appellants next filed a series of pleadings criticizing 
the Court and then criticizing the clerks office for their 
apparent lack of notice of the precise date of the entry of 
the judgment of dismissal. It is unclear from the record 
whether the appellants knew of the date and were trying to 
cover their tracks or whether they in good faith did not 
know the date of the entry of the judgment, however, the 
notice of appeal was filed, apparently, with the appropriate 
filing fee on February 13, 1987, five months and three days 
after the entry of the order of dismissal. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
Appellants filed an action in Circuit Court which 
litigated certain justicible issues on the merits and 
they appealed. Appellants filed a second action in the 
District Court being unhappy with the result in the Circuit 
Court; the District Court dismissed the case and an untimely 
appeal was filed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Respondents take the firm position that the 
failure to file the notice of appeal within 30 days is 
jurisdictional. The failure to file the notice of appeal 
and the appropriate filing fee is jurisdictional and 
pursuant to the requirement of the 30 day filing rule, the 
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Supreme Court has no jurisdiction whatsoever in the matter 
and any corrective measures or late filing of any other 
papers are immaterial. 
II. Assuming arguendo, that the Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction, the District Court was proper in dismissing 
the case where the case was simply a refiling or an 
amendment of a Circuit Court case that the appellants were 
not happy with. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
WHEN AN APPEAL IS PERMITTED FROM A DISTRICT COURT 
TO THE SUPREME COURT, THE TIME WITHIN WHICH AN 
APPEAL MAY BE TAKEN SHALL BE 30 DAYS AFTER 
THE DATE OF ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT OR ORDER 
APPEALED FROM 
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter 
of right from the District Court to the Supreme Court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3, shall be filed with the 
clerk of the District Court within 30 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order. The timely filing of the 
notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4. Appeal From Final 
Judgment and Order. 
Filing of notice of appeal within time required by law 
was essential to clothe Supreme Court with jurisdiction to 
adjudicate questions raised by appeal. Anderson v. 
Halthusen Mercantile Co., 83 Pac. 560, (Utah 1906). 
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The appeal would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction 
where notice of appeal was not filed within one month after 
entry of judgment as required by rule. Ratliff Estate of v. 
Conrad, 19 Utah 2d 346, 431 P.2d 571, (1967). 
The appeal would be dismissed on respondent's motion 
when not taken within time allowed by statute. Blyth & 
Fargo Co. v. Swenson, 49 Pac. 1027, (Utah 1897). 
Respondents respectfully submit that the 30 day appeal 
rule is jurisdictional and does not require the clerks 
office, opposing counsel or any other party to notify the 
adverse party of the precise date of the entry of the order 
or judgment. 
The current law under the Appellate Rules require the 
beginning modicum of notice to simply be in compliance with 
the District Court Rules of Practice, Rule 2.9(b). See, 
e.g;. , Calfo v. D.C. Stewart Co., 717 P.2d 697 (Utah 1986); 
Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980). 
Respondents, pursuant to Rule 2.9(b) mailed a proposed 
copy of the judgment to all parties on August 18, 1986, [Tr. 
83, 93]. 
The duty to determine when the order was signed and/or 
entered is incumbant upon the party seeking the appeal. The 
simple fact of the matter is, as litigous as the appellants 
have been, they simply failed to determine the date of the 
entry of the judgment of dismissal. There is a pleading in 
- 6 -
the record [Tr. 88], although not a valid motion to amend or 
alter a judgment, objecting to the language of the judgment. 
Respondents have a right to rely on the law. Knowing 
that the 30 day appeal rule is jurisdictional, respondents 
had a right to rely on the fact that their case had been 
concluded on or after October 11, 1986. 
The new Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure differ from 
old Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 72 and Rule 73, only 
in form and, in fact, changed the required time element of 
one month to 30 days. The statutes and previous law which 
has construed the time for appeal under the old Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 72 and 73, clearly state and hold as 
above quoted that the time for the appeal is in fact 
jurisdictional. See, e.cj* * Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 
657 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1983); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 
434 (Utah 1982). 
That is, the appropriate steps must be taken by filing 
the notice and the payment of the filing fee to perfect the 
appeal. Other defects have been overlooked, that is, the 
time for filing the docketing statement, the times for 
filing briefs and other matters as not being jurisdictional, 
but the law in Utah is quite clear that the time limit for 
filing the notice of appeal and perfecting the appeal is 
clearly jurisdictional. 
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Failure to act properly within the required time period 
has caused the right of appeal to be lost and denies the 
Appellate Court jurisdiction of any further matters. The 
appellants simply did not follow the admonition given by the 
District Judge in his ruling; they did not follow the rules; 
therefore, they are precluded. 
II. 
HAVING BEEN RULED AGAINST UPON THE MERITS IN THE 
CIRCUIT COURT, THE APPELLANTS CANNOT AMEND A 
COMPLAINT AND RE-FILE IN ANOTHER COURT TO 
RESURRECT THE SAME CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER 
GENERALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPALS OF RES JUDICATA 
The motion to dismiss Showalter Ford, Inc., was 
supported by affidavits and briefed, memorandums were 
submitted, the Honorable Donald R. Crist considered the 
matter, the appellants had opportunity to counter the 
affidavits and did not, the matter was decided in favor of 
Showalter Ford on the basis of a duly considered motion 
under Rule 56 for summary judgment. Showalter Ford, Inc., 
was dismissed from the Circuit Court case with prejudice. 
The appellants filed a motion to amend to add Gary Showalter 
as a party, the motion was briefed, submitted and an order 
denying that motion was signed on May 13, 1986, [Tr. 19]. 
The appellants filed their notice of appeal on those 
issues to the District Court in the Circuit Court case. 
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The appellants filed a new action alleging basically 
the same facts and wrongs that were alleged in the Circuit 
Court; although the pleading is not dated and the summons 
served upon the defendants was dated June 22, 1986, the 
clerks office indicates the complaint was filed and received 
June 18, 1986. After further exchange of pleadings, again, 
some of which were not understandable, the respondents moved 
the Court to dismiss the new case primarily on the basis of 
res judicata. In fact, the plaintiffs attempted in their 
new complaint to allege and reallege the same factual 
transactions and occurrences which are presently pending in 
the Seventh Circuit Court and in the Seventh District Court 
on appeal as a means of subterfuge and as an independent 
cause of action which has previously been adjudicated in the 
court below and which is on appeal in the District Court. 
Appellants make the fallacious argument that the 
Circuit Court does not have jurisdiction because in their 
new complaint they have alleged violations of the Consumer 
Practices Act. Respondents contend that the Circuit Court 
would have jurisdiction of a case or controversy under the 
Consumer Practices Act and that the only distinction is the 
prayer for damages which the appellants have asserted in 
their new case in the District Court. 
Appellants make the argument that the District Court 
has exclusive jurisdiction of cases filed under the Utah 
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Consumer Sales Practices Act. The statute provides in Utah 
Code Annotated §13-11-6 (Supp. 1986) (1): 
"The District Courts of the state have 
jurisdiction over any supplier as to any act or 
practice in this state governed by this act or as to 
any claim arising from the consumer transaction subject 
to this act." 
This provisions has to do with jurisdiction of those 
parties doing business in the state or involved in consumer 
transactions, but certainly by the express language of the 
statute, does not grant the District Court with exclusive 
jurisdiction of unconscionable acts or practices. 
The appellants are confused in that quite clearly the 
Circuit Courts of this state have concurrent jurisdiction of 
cases brought under those sections as well. 
No new facts have been gleened in discovery and the 
facts were present and the case could have been filed under 
the Utah Consumer Practices Act in the first instance, but 
appellants chose not to do so. 
Appellants also make the argument that Gary Showalter 
was not a party in the Circuit Court, so a new action 
against Gary Showalter should be upheld in the District 
Court. Judge Crist duly considered the motion to amend to 
add Gary Showalter and on argument of counsel concluded that 
Gary Showalterfs involvement in the case did not warrant his 
being included in the complaint, [Tr. 19]. It is 
respondents' position, therefore, that the argument letting 
- 10 -
Showalter Ford out of the case equally applied to Gary 
Showalter as an individual. Arguments were adduced and made 
in memorandum and Judge Crist1s consideration in the 
memorandums that any liability of Gary Showalter would be in 
his capacity as an agent of Showalter ford in any event. 
The law of res judicata is a farily easy concept and as 
stated in Am. Jur. 2.d JUDGMENTS, §394, p.558. 
"...As stated in many cases the doctine of res 
judicata is that an existing final judgment rendered 
upon the merits without fraud or collusion by a court 
of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of causes of 
action and of facts or issues thereby litigated, as to 
the parties and their privies in all other actions in 
the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent 
jurisdiction." 
By virtue of res judicata, a final determination of a 
court of competent jurisdiction necessarily affirming 
existence of any fact is conclusive evidence of existence of 
that fact when it is again in issue in subsequent litigation 
between same parties in same or other courts and facts 
decided in first suit cannot be disputed or relitigated, 
although later suit is upon a different cause of action. 
See Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal.2d 315, 202 P.2d 73 (1949). 
The doctrine of res judicata precludes parties or their 
privies from relitigating a cause of action that has been 
finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, and 
under such doctrine any issue necessarily decided in prior 
litigation is conclusively determined as to the parties or 
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their privies if it is involved in a subsequent lawsuit on a 
different cause of action. See Burnhard v. Bank of America 
Natl. Trust & Saving Ass'n., 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942). 
By way of conclusion the following quotation from Am. 
Jur. is instructive: 
"The doctrine of res judicata is but a 
manifestation of the recognition that endless 
litigation leads to confusion or chaos. The doctrine 
reflects the refusal of the law to tolerate a 
multiplicity of, or needless, litigation and is based 
on the worthy premise that the interest of the proper 
administration of justice is best served by limiting 
parties to one fair trial of an issue or cause. It 
rests upon the ground that the party to be effected, or 
some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated, 
or had an opportunity to litigate, the same matter in a 
former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and 
should not be permitted to litigate it again to the 
harassment and vexation of his opponent." Am. Jur. 2d 
JUDGMENTS, §395, pp. 561, 656. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants failed to perfect their appeal within the 30 
day time limit required by the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure; therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction. 
The District Court ruled properly in dismissing the new 
case in District Court since the factual matters, 
transactions, occurrences and causes of action had already 
been plead and/or decided on the merits in the Circuit Court 
case which is currently on appeal. 
This case is an example of the abuse of judicial 
process which can create expense for the parties and the 
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appellants chose not to obtain the advice of counsel as 
specifically suggested by the District Court Judge and are 
not prejudiced by the dismissal of this appeal inasmuch as 
they still have their day in court in the case which is 
still pending, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 
1988. 
,aEASLIN-S/ANDERSDN 
day of January, 
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